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Designing Real-Time Prices to Reduce Load Variability with HVAC
John Audie Cabrera2, Yonatan Mintz1, Jhoanna Rhodette Pedrasa2, and Anil Aswani1
Abstract—Utilities use demand response to shift or reduce
electricity usage of flexible loads, to better match electricity
demand to power generation. A common mechanism is peak
pricing (PP), where consumers pay reduced (increased) prices
for electricity during periods of low (high) demand, and its sim-
plicity allows consumers to understand how their consumption
affects costs. However, new consumer technologies like internet-
connected smart thermostats simplify real-time pricing (RP),
because such devices can automate the tradeoff between costs
and consumption. These devices enable consumer choice under
RP by abstracting this tradeoff into a question of quality of
service (e.g., comfort) versus price. This paper uses a principal-
agent framework to design PP and RP rates for heating,
ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) to address adverse
selection due to variations in consumer comfort preferences. We
formulate the pricing problem as a stochastic bilevel program,
and numerically solve it by reformulation as a mixed integer
program (MIP). Last, we compare the effectiveness of different
pricing schemes on reductions of peak load or load variability.
We find that PP pricing induces HVAC consumption to spike
high (before), spike low (during), and spike high (after) the PP
event, whereas RP achieves reductions in peak loads and load
variability while preventing large spikes in electricity usage.
I. INTRODUCTION
High demand variability stresses the electrical grid by
increasing the mismatch with supply, and it is costly for util-
ities because it requires adding redundant power generation.
Demand response is an alternative that induces consumers to
reduce or shift their consumption by setting prices by time
of day [1]–[5]. For example, peak pricing (PP) reduces the
peak demand of electricity by charging consumers reduced
(increased) rates for electricity during periods of low (high)
demand. This is a common structure for demand response
programs because the simplicity of PP allows consumers to
understand how their consumption impacts their costs.
Real-time pricing (RP) of electricity is less common
because historically the complex pricing structure of RP
makes it difficult for consumers to match consumption to
prices. However, new consumer technologies like internet-
connected smart thermostats [6]–[11] simplify RP, because
such devices can automate the tradeoff between costs and
consumption. These devices simplify RP by abstracting this
tradeoff into a question of quality of service (e.g., comfort)
versus price, which is easier for consumers to understand.
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This paper designs PP and RP electricity rates using
realistic, validated models of heating, ventilation, and air-
conditioning (HVAC) [6], [12], and there are three contri-
butions. First, we use a principal-agent model [13], [14]
to formulate the problem of a utility designing rates for
HVAC that responds to prices, where the consumer has an
acceptable (but unknown to the utility) comfort level. The
challenge is that prices must be designed so that inflexible
(with respect to comfort) consumers do not get excessive
benefits relative to flexible consumers, since flexible con-
sumers provide more benefits to the utility. Second, we pose
the design problem as a mixed integer program (MIP). Third,
we present numerically solvable approximations of this MIP,
and then evaluate the impact of the resulting PP and RP rates.
A. PP for HVAC Demand Response
HVAC is arguably the most significant target for demand
response since it the largest source of energy consumption
in most buildings [15]. This is relevant from the standpoint
of utilities because HVAC use is obviously correlated with
high outdoor temperature, which means that HVAC usage
in different buildings is strongly correlated with each other
and is an important contributor to peak demand [16]. As a
result, many studies have considered different aspects of PP
for demand response of HVAC. A large number of demand
response programs that have been implemented by utility
companies use PP to reduce peak load [1]–[5], and such
programs have been found to provide varying levels of value
to utilities. Within the controls literature, the use of model
predictive control (MPC) techniques is particularly popular
for demand response of HVAC [17]–[20] because of the
ability of MPC to handle complex constraints.
B. RP for HVAC Demand Response
Recent work studied RP design for HVAC that automates
price-responsiveness. One approach uses stochastic differen-
tial equations to design prices [21], [22], and this work found
a benefit to RP for a simplified HVAC model. In contrast,
we consider in this paper the rate design problem using
realistic, validated models of HVAC [6], [12]. Another body
of work [23], [24] considers RP design using realistic HVAC
models. Our paper differs in two substantive ways. The first
is we use a different notion of comfort: Comfort in [23],
[24] was defined using the temperature set-point, whereas
in our paper we define comfort using allowable deviations
in the temperature from the desired value. The second is we
consider adverse selection, which are the issues caused when
an inflexible (with respect to comfort) consumer accepts a
rate designed for a flexible consumer, in our rate design.
C. Outline
Sect. II describes our model for the consumer and
our model for the electric utility company, including the
principal-agent model the utility uses to design the electricity
rates. The key feature of the model is the fact that consumers
are either flexible or inflexible with regards to their comfort,
but this information is hidden from the electric utility. The
electricity rate will not be efficient for the utility if it
does not account for this information asymmetry (formally
known as adverse selection). Next, Sect. III describes how
to numerically solve the rate design problem using an MIP
reformulation of the principal-agent model. As part of our
approach, we derive relaxations that facilitate fast numerical
solution. We conclude with Sect. IV, which numerically
solves the pricing problem and then compares the impact
of PP and RP on electricity consumption by HVAC.
II. MODEL OF CONSUMER AND ELECTRIC UTILITY
In this section, we present our model for the consumer
and the electric utility. We also formally define the problem
of using a principal-agent framework to design either PP or
RP electricity prices for HVAC demand response.
A. Consumer Model
The first part of our model defines comfort in relation to
deviations in room temperature from the desired value: Con-
sumers are inflexible (±2◦C deviation from desired temper-
ature) or flexible (±3◦C deviation from desired temperature)
in their comfort, and these ranges are from the ASHRAE 55
standard [25] that defines quantitative models of occupant
comfort. We use Td to refer to a consumer’s desired room
temperature, and the T , T are the upper and lower bounds of
comfort for the consumer. So if the consumer is inflexible,
then T = Td−2 and T = Td+2 . Similarly, if the consumer
is flexible, then T = Td − 3 and T = Td + 3.
The next part of our model describe the room temperature
dynamics and provides an energy model for the consumer.
We use a linear time-invariant model for room temperature
Tn+1 = krTn + kcun + kwwn + qn, (1)
where Tn, un, wn, qn are room temperature, HVAC control
input, outside temperature, and heating load due to occu-
pancy, respectively, and each time step is a 15 min interval.
This model has been validated [6], [12]. The total energy
usage of the consumer is
∑N
n=1(bn + pun), where bn is
nondeferrable electricity load, p is a constant that converts
input un to energy consumption [6], [12], andN is a horizon.
An important component of our model characterizes the
HVAC controller, which automates the tradeoff between
room temperature and electricity consumption. In particular,
we assume that the HVAC is controlled by MPC:
min
∑N
n=1
(
(Tn − Td)
2 + γcnun
)
s.t. Tn+1 = krTn + kcun + kwwn + qn
Tn ∈ [T , T ], un ∈ [0, u], for n = 1, . . . , N
(2)
where γ is a constant that trades off temperature and elec-
tricity usage, u is the maximum control input, and cn is the
price of electricity at time n.
The last part of the model describes what information is
known by the consumer (and implicitly known by the HVAC
controller). The variable
θ =
{
kr, kc, kw, wn, qn, bn, γ, Td, T , T , u,
for n = 1, . . . , N
}
(3)
completely characterizes each consumer, and it is known as
type in the principal-agent literature [13], [14]. (The value
p is a constant known by everyone.) We assume that the
consumer (and HVAC controller) exactly knows the value
of θ, and knows the electricity price c = {c1, . . . , cN}.
Moreover, we use J(c; θ) to refer to the minimum value
of (2), and u∗(c; θ) refers to the minimizer of (2).
B. Model of Electric Utility Company
An important component in the electric utility model is the
information asymmetry between the utility and consumers.
Specifically, we assume the utility does not know θ for any
single customer. Instead, the utility knows the overall prob-
ability distribution for θ. (Recall the utility and consumers
know p, which is a constant.) We also assume that both the
utility and consumers know the electricity price c.
The next element in the utility model describes the goal
of the electricity pricing for demand response. If the goal is
to reduce peak load, then the utility aims to minimize
Vp = Eθ
(∑t2
n=t1
u∗n(c; θ)
)
, (4)
where [t1, t2] is a time range during which the peak load
is anticipated by the utility. If the goals is to reduce load
variability, then the utility aims to minimize
Vl = Eθ
(
varn
(
bn + u
∗
n(c; θ)
))
, (5)
where varn(·) is the variance over n = 1, . . . , N . We will
consider designing PP and RP for both goals.
The electric utility is interested in designing c, and we
describe the constraints that characterize PP and RP rates.
If the utility is designing PP rates, then this means they are
selecting from
Cpp =
{
c :
cn = ct1 , for n ∈ [t1, t2]
cn = c1, for n ∈ {1, . . . , N} \ [t1, t2]
}
.
(6)
This expresses prices that are constant within the peak period
[t1, t2], and constant (with a possibly different value) outside
of the peak period. Similarly, if the utility is designing RP
rates, then this means they are selecting from
Crp =
{
c :
c1 = cN
|cn+1 − cn| ≤ ρ, for n = 1, . . . , N1
}
. (7)
This expresses prices that are equal at the beginning and
end of the horizon, and such that the rate of change is
bounded by a constant ρ. Lastly, we use f = {f, . . . , f}
kr kc kw average qn
Room 1 0.63 2.64 0.10 6.78
Room 2 0.43 1.95 0.18 9.44
TABLE I
TEMPERATUREMODEL COEFFICIENTS
to refer to a flat pricing structure, and f in particular refers
to the existing electricity price prior to the introduction of
the demand response pricing.
C. Principle-Agent Model for Pricing
The last part of the model for the utility describes the
principal-agent formulation used to design electricity prices.
In particular, we assume the utility solves
min V + λ · Eθ
(∑N
n=1
(
fnu
∗
n(f ; θ)− cnu
∗
n(c; θ)
))
s.t J(c; θ) ≤ J(f; θ)
c ∈ C
cn ∈ [c, c], for n = 1, . . . , N
(8)
to design the electricity rates, where V is either Vp (to
minimize peak load) or Vv (to minimize load variance), and C
is either Cpp (for PP) or Crp (for RP). Note the c, c are bounds
on the minimum and maximum electricity rate, respectively.
Here,
∑N
n=1
(
fnu
∗
n(f ; θ) − cnu
∗
n(c; θ)
)
is the amount of
revenue the utility loses from implementing the new pricing
c (relative to the existing rate f ), and so this means λ is
a constant that the utility uses to tradeoff achieving the
demand response goal with revenue loss. We do not include
the nondeferrable electricity load bn when defining revenue
loss, because in our setting the electricity rates for the non-
deferrable electricity load are different (and left unchanged)
from the rates c for HVAC electricity consumption.
There are two game-theoretic considerations that must be
discussed when defining and solving principal-agent models
[13], [14]. The constraint J(c; θ) ≤ J(f; θ) is known as a
participation constraint, and it ensures that the new electric-
ity rates c are such that the overall utility of the consumer
under the new rates c is equal or better than the overall
utility of the consumer under the original rate f . The second
game-theoretic aspect to be discussed is adverse selection.
We mitigate adverse selection by minimizing the expectation
(with respect to type θ) of the goal V and revenue loss.
III. NUMERICAL SOLUTION OF PRICING PROBLEM
This section studies how to solve the principal-agent
model (8). The main difficulty is that (8) is a bilevel program
[26], [27], which means that (8) is an optimization prob-
lem in which some variables are solutions to optimization
problems themselves. In particular, recall that u∗(c; θ) is the
minimizer to (2). In order to solve (8), we first show how
the problem can be reformulated as a MIP. Then we describe
some relaxations that facilitate numerical solution of the MIP.
A. MIP Reformulation of Pricing Problem
They key idea in reformulating (8) is to replace the
convex optimization problem (2) by the KKT conditions,
which provides constraints that u∗(c; θ) must satisfy. More
specifically, the KKT conditions for (2) can be written as the
following set of mixed integer linear constraints:
Tn+1 = krTn + kcu
∗
n(c; θ) + kwwn + qn
γcn − kcνn + µn − µn = 0
0 ≤ µn ≤ Mηn,
0 ≤ µ
n
≤ Mζn
uηn + u (1− ηn) ≤ u
∗
n(c; θ) ≤ uζn + u (1− ζn)
ηn, ζn ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 1, . . . , N − 1
(9)
and also that
(Tn − Td) + νn−1 − krνn + ξn − ξn = 0
0 ≤ ξn ≤ Mxn
0 ≤ ξ
n
≤ Myn
Txn + T (1− xn) ≤ Tn ≤ Tyn + T (1− yn)
xn, yn ∈ {0, 1}, for 2 = 1, . . . , N
(10)
where M > 0 is a sufficiently large constant [28].
The problem (8) becomes an infinite dimensional MIP,
after a few more reformulations. The first is to observe
that Eθ(fnu
∗
n(f ; θ)) is a constant, and so can be removed
from the objective function. The second is to note that
J(f; θ) is also a constant since it does not depend on any
decision variables. The third reformulation is to substitute
J(c; θ) with
∑N
n=1
(
(Tn − Td)
2 + γcnu
∗
n(c; θ)
)
. Though
this yields an infinite dimensional problem, using sample
average approximation (SAA) [29], [30] to approximate the
reformulation gives a finite dimensional MIP.
B. Relaxation of Pricing Problem
The reformulated MIP described above is still difficult
to solve because it involves nonconvex quadratic terms
cnu
∗
n(c; θ), and so additional relaxations are needed so that
the price design problem can be solved using standard nu-
merical optimization software. The quadratic term is relaxed
using the McCormick envelope [31] to
rn ≥ cu
∗
n(c; θ) + ucn − u · c
rn ≥ cu
∗
n(c; θ) + ucn − c · u
rn ≤ cu
∗
n(c; θ) + ucn − c · u
rn ≤ cu
∗
n(c; θ) + ucn − c · u
(11)
for n = 1, . . . , N . With this relaxation, the SAA form of the
reformulated problem is a mixed-integer quadratic program
(MIQP), which can be solved using existing software.
However, numerical solution of MIQP’s can be slow. So
we next describe two additional relaxations that speed up
computation by approximating the MIQP using a mixed-
integer linear program (MILP), which can typically be nu-
merically solved faster. First, we replace (Tn − Td)
2 with
4|Tn−Td|
2 since (Tn−Td) ≤ 3|Tn−Td|
2 when |Tn−Td| ≤ 3
Flat Rate PP Rate RP Rate
Inflexible
Peak Load 28.3 27.0 27.6
Load Variance 0.49 0.54 0.42
Flexible
Peak Load 19.1 15.3 17.5
Load Variance 0.25 0.28 0.17
TABLE II
PRICING TO REDUCE PEAK LOAD
as is the case from our assumptions about comfort. Sec-
ond, we replace varn
(
bn+ u
∗
n(c; θ)
)
with N−1
∑N
n=1 |bn+
u∗n(c; θ)−m(θ)|, where m(θ) =
1
N
∑N
n=1 u
∗
n(f; θ). The idea
is we approximate the variance by (a) replacing squares with
absolute value, and (b) replacing the mean in the variance
1
N
∑N
n=1 u
∗
n(c; θ) with the mean m(θ).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically solve our MILP relaxation
of the pricing problem for a 24 hour horizon. All of the
calculations where conducted on laptop computer with dual
core 2.5GHz processor and 8GB RAM using MATLAB with
the CVX toolbox [32] and the Gurobi solver [33]. We finish
by evaluating the quality of the designed electricity rates,
and the results are summarized in Tables II and III.
A. Values of Type Parameters
For scenarios with PP and peak load reduction, we set the
peak times to be 1pm–4pm. Our bounds on the electricity
cost were 7PhP ≤ cn ≤ 20PhP, where PhP is Philippines
Pesos. Parameters in the room temperature dynamics (1)
were chosen by uniformly sampling from the paramters in
Table I. The first set of parameters are from [6], [12], while
the second set of parameters were replicated using the same
methodology from [6], [12] with data from our UP-BRITE
testbed located at the University of the Phillipines, Diliman.
We set the probability of a consumer to have high flexibil-
ity to be 0.2. Scenario generation for outside temperature
was performed using data from Weather Underground [34],
scenario generation for heating load due to occupancy was
based on occupancy models, and scenario generation for
nondeferrable electricity load was based on data from [35].
B. Results and Discussion for PP
Results for PP for peak load reduction are shown in Fig. 1.
PP is effective in reducing the peak load for both the flexible
and inflexible consumers; but there is a side effect in which
the HVAC has sharp increases in electricity consumption
both prior to and after the peak period, as well as a sharp
decrease in consumption at the start and end of the peak
period. This substantially increases the variability of the load
profile. Results for PP for load variance reduction are shown
in Fig. 2. PP is not effective in decreasing load variability
because sharp changes in electricity price induce the HVAC
to make sharp changes in consumption.
Flat Rate PP Rate RP Rate
Inflexible
Peak Load 28.3 27.3 27.6
Load Variance 0.49 0.49 0.41
Flexible
Peak Load 19.1 17.7 17.8
Load Variance 0.25 0.26 0.17
TABLE III
PRICING TO REDUCE LOAD VARIANCE
C. Results and Discussion for RP
The results for RP for peak load reduction are shown in
Fig. 3. The RP is effective in reducing the peak load for
both the flexible and inflexible consumers, and it in fact also
reduces the variance of the electricity load. The results for
RP for load variance reduction are shown in Fig. 4. The RP
is effective in decreasing the variability of the total electricity
load, and it also reduces the peak load for both the flexible
and inflexible consumers. The variance in load under this
latter contract is lower than the variance under the former
contract, but the difference is small.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of designing PP and RP electricity
rates using realistic, validated models of HVAC. We used a
principal-agent model to formulate the problem of a utility
designing rates for HVAC that responds to prices, where
the consumer has an acceptable (but unknown to the utility)
comfort level. We showed how this problem could be posed
as numerically tractable MILP’s, and then solved these
MILP’s to compare the efficacy of different pricing schemes.
We found that RP was substantially better at reducing load
variability than PP, whereas PP was superior in reducing peak
load. Directions for future work include incorporating more
detailed consumer models to better understand best practices
for the design of incentives for effective demand response.
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